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Abstract: Using the mechanics of creep in material sciences as a metaphor, we present a 
general framework to understand the evolution of financial, economic and social systems and 
to construct scenarios for the future. In a nutshell, highly non-linear out-of-equilibrium 
systems subjected to exogenous perturbations tend to exhibit a long phase of slow apparent 
stable evolution, which are nothing but slow maturations towards instabilities, failures and 
changes of regimes. With examples from history where a small event had a cataclysmic 
consequence, we propose a novel view of the current state of the world via the logical 
scenarios that derive, avoiding the traps of an illusionary stability and simple linear 
extrapolation. The endogenous scenarios are “muddling along”, “managing through”, and 
“blood red abyss”. The exogenous scenarios are “painful adjustment” and “golden east”. 
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1- How to boil a frog 
When you put a frog in boiling water, the frog will jump out immediately. But, if you place her 
in a frying pan with cold water, and you increase the temperature very slowly, the frog will be 
unaware of the danger and will gradually adapt to its environment, until she is cooked to 
death. This phenomenon was under scientific investigation at the end of the 19th century. 
Zealous scientists argued about the optimal rate of temperature increase and the possible 
effect of the initial state and health of the poor animals. Anecdotal or not, the metaphor 
embraces a deep insight: the wisdom of how a slowly increasing load can remain unnoticed 
until the last small straw breaks the camel’s back. 
 
We all share creepy experiences in everyday life: a picture falling off the wall after it has 
been hanging there for years, a plastic shopping bag dropping off the table half an hour after 
you put it there. Things that seem to be stable can, all of a sudden fall, drop, fail, break, 
bend, snap or even die. It seems spooky. Is this magic or sheer bad luck? No one notices 
any change; no one sees it coming, until something big happens. 
 
Even though these experiences may seem mysterious, there is always a scientific rationale. 
The surprise factor is just the consequence of our linear thinking, of the perception that all 
systems only gradually change, stuck in some kind of equilibrium. We naturally extrapolate 
such observations into the future, because we are not trained in seeing and understanding 
complex non-linear processes. But if you just sit down and take some distance, you will be 
able to enjoy the real beauty of our physical and social world and you will find out that hardly 
anything in life is really stable and in equilibrium, but rather slowly creeps towards a change 
of regime. 
 
We will start our exploration with a description of the mechanics of creep. This is a textbook 
example, in material science, of a counter intuitive, non-linear, abrupt process. Creep will set 
the scene and become the thread throughout this piece. We will argue that such highly non-
linear mechanisms, like creep, are not bound merely to the sphere of solid materials and 
physical systems, but also take place in our social, financial and economic fabric. This can 
be observed in the existence of tipping points, when a system is slowly pushed over the edge 
of a critical threshold and a runaway process sets in leading to a change of regime or 
bifurcation. We will back this assertion up with some examples from history, cases where a 
small event had a cataclysmic consequence. This will allow us to take a new, fresh look at 
the current state of the world. It will also give us a better sense of how we can construct 
future scenarios without falling in the trap of an illusionary stability and without using simple 
linear extrapolation. 
 
 
2- Creepy mechanics 
Creep, also known as “static fatigue”, occurs when you put a material under a constant 
stress, which is below its mechanical strength, so that it does not break immediately. It is by 
waiting a sufficiently long time that the cumulative strain may finally end up in a catastrophic 
rupture [1].  
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The process is often divided into three regimes. During the primary regime, the stress 
actually strengthens the material, due to work hardening. This is well understood by 
clocksmiths who tap the teeth of brass gears and ratchets to give them a superior wear 
resistance. This net positive effect, however, fades out and at some point a balance is found 
between the strengthening due to work hardening and the weakening due to the occurrence 
of micro-fractures caused by the constant stress level. At that point, the secondary creep 
sets in. This stage is characterized by a quasi-constant imperceptible deformation rate. It 
seems as if the stress has no significant effect on the material; everything is stable, the setup 
looks robust. But over time, the system slowly evolves towards the tertiary creep regime. 
Suddenly, and unexpectedly, the strain rate accelerates and the material breaks. This is like 
a climbing rope that snaps. When a first fiber breaks, the load is distributed over the 
remaining fibers. Each time a new fiber snaps, the load on the other fibers increases. This 
creates a positive feedback mechanism that leads to a runaway process, the failure of the 
rope and the fall of the rock climber.  
 
It is very important to stress here that the process we are describing is endogenous, which 
means that it is due to internal restructuration and self-organization. We are not talking about 
the failure of a material due to some kind of external event. Just picture a setup of a material 
under stress, no more and no less. For a very long time, the situation remains stable and 
apparently, everything looks perfectly fine. Then, all of a sudden, it breaks. This failure is 
deeply rooted in the fundamental properties of the system itself. The stable phase may hold 
on for years or centuries, but slowly, creep drives the system towards criticality. When a 
critical threshold is reached, something snaps and a new regime sets in.  
 
Interestingly, in some materials, the catastrophic third creep regime is never reached. This is, 
for example, the case in materials that have a mix of solid and liquid-like properties. When a 
balance is found between creation and annihilation of micro-fractures, between damaging 
and healing forces, the situation can muddle through forever. An example is the very slow 
flow of window glass. It is a well-known fact that windows of churches, which were built 
several centuries ago, are thicker at the bottom than at the top due to creep flow of the “solid” 
glass, pulled down by gravity.  
 
 
3- Peripeteia 
This scientific curiosity may be gefundenes Fressen for physicists and mechanical engineers, 
but why would this be of any interest to investors, policy makers, regulators or financial 
analysts? There is a growing body of evidence that socio-economic systems behave in a 
similar way. More and more publications in the scientific literature [2-9] describe creep-like 
processes ending in abrupt rupture-like events occurring in our social, financial, ecological 
and economic fabric. From a mathematical perspective, this observation is not a surprise. It 
can be understood as a generic behavior of dynamical systems. According to general 
theorems of the theory of bifurcations and their classifications, there are only a finite number 
of ways by which systems can change regimes. Moreover, these changes of regime are not 
progressive but abrupt and present universal properties. This provides a meta-justification of 
the deep relationship between processes apparently as different as earthquakes, epileptic 
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seizures and financial crashes, which is founded at a very fundamental level within the very 
structure of dynamical systems. 
 
 In such systems, stress may be exercised through control parameters such as investor trust, 
debt levels, deficits, food prices, the relative size of the real versus the financial economy, 
health, inequality, innovation, demographics, inflation, interest rates, global warming, bio-
diversity, house prices and so on. 
 
Before a critical threshold is reached, these parameters slowly drift, hardly changing the 
stress in the system, which has, at that point, a quasi-stable characteristic, only disturbed by 
noise. This gives us an illusion of control, we think that we understand the system and we 
assume that it will continue behaving as we expect it to for the indefinite future. We make 
naïve forecasts based on simple extrapolated trends without a real fundamental 
understanding of the underlying processes. Forecasters are happy and proud that they 
manage to find a trend and can fit a curve to it, without realizing that in fact they are blind. 
Examples are the credo that stocks always go up in the long run, the concept that inflation is 
contained because the velocity of money is low, the idea that governmental debt can always 
be refunded in the capital markets or that house prices always go up.  
 
The real risks and opportunities in our modern, interconnected society can only be better 
understood if we get out of this fallacy. Only then will we be able to see and interpret the 
generic symptoms that occur when a system approaches criticality.  
 
In a seminal paper in Nature, in 2009, Marten Scheffer, a Dutch environmental scientist, 
describes this as follows [10]: 
At first sight, it may seem surprising that disparate phenomena such as the collapse of an 
overharvested population and ancient climatic transitions could be indicated by similar 
signals. However… the dynamics of systems near a critical point have generic properties, 
regardless of differences in the details of each system. 
Extreme events are not unknowable unknowns. They are endogenous and thus deeply 
embedded in our social, economic, financial and ecological systems. As a consequence, 
there may be predictability. This can be, as is documented by Scheffer, in the form of a 
critical slowing down of the system leading to an increase in autocorrelation in the resulting 
pattern of fluctuations [10]. But there can also be early-warning signals in the form of “near 
misses” or “glitches” [11]. On the one hand, this is a positive message as it tells us that we 
can make a difference by observing, learning and taking action. But on the other hand, it also 
forces us to take responsibility because it prohibits us from hiding behind force majeure 
principles, simply blaming fate. 
 
From the moment we wake up, till the time we go to sleep, massive amounts of information 
come our way. Our brain is hard-wired to deal with all that complexity by using simple, clear-
cut, experience-based techniques, called heuristics, also known as rules of thumb. 
Simplification and pattern recognition help us through the day. It is in art, though, that our 
deep connectedness with turning points finds its strongest accepted expression. Sudden 
shifts are a natural part of our world and as such, we sense their aesthetic attraction. This is 
	  |	  P a g e 	  
	  
5	  
beautifully illustrated in the use of peripeteia in literature, which is, according to Aristotle, the 
most powerful part of a plot in a tragedy. Peripeteia is a sudden reversal or a turning point 
that emerges naturally from the circumstances. The example par excellence is the well-
known story of Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex [12], where the protagonist fulfills his destiny, to kill 
his father and marry his mother, actually by running away from it in the first place. The story 
takes the reader by the hand gently following its course. Then, something snaps. But, the 
turning point is not the result of some externality. Contrarily to a Deus ex machina, the 
turning point with peripeteia is logical within the frame of the story. 
 
The aesthetics of Greek tragedies can help us escape our evolutionary determinism. This is 
a necessary condition to see the future challenges that our society is facing. The study of 
history can show us the way. By carefully scrutinizing the past beyond our heuristic reflexes 
and by disentangling peripeteias in past dramatic events, we may be able to construct more 
realistic scenarios for the future. 
 
 
4- The sand grains of history 
In his book Civilization, the British historian Niall Ferguson explains that civilizations are 
highly complex systems, made of a large number of interacting components organized more 
like a Namibian termite mound than an Egyptian pyramid. Interestingly, he writes [13]: 
Such systems can appear to operate quite stably for some time, apparently in equilibrium, in 
reality constantly adapting. But there comes a moment when they ‘go critical’. A slight 
perturbation can set off a ‘phase transition’ from a benign equilibrium to a crisis – a single 
grain of sand causes an apparently stable sandcastle to fall in on itself. 
History is full of such sand grains, where a linear cause-and-consequence approach does 
not make any sense.  
 
In Sarajevo, on June 28th, 1914, a driver took a wrong turn. This triggered a sequence of 
events described most vividly by Mark Buchanan in his book Ubiquity [3]: 
The automobile stopped directly in front of a nineteen-year-old Bosnian Serb student, Gavrilo 
Princip. A member of the Serbian terrorist organization Black Hand, Princip couldn’t believe 
his luck. Striding forward, he reached the carriage. He drew a small pistol from his pocket. 
Pointed it. Pulled the trigger twice. Within thirty minutes, the Austro-Hungarian Archduke 
Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie, the carriage’s passengers, were dead. Within hours, 
the political fabric of Europe had begun to unravel...  
When the First World War ended five years later, ten million lay dead. Europe fell into an 
uncomfortable quiet that lasted twenty years, and then the Second World War claimed 
another thirty million. 
 
More recently, on December 17, 2010, a Tunisian street vendor called Tarek al-Tayeb 
Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire in protest to the constant harassment and humiliations 
by a municipal official [14]. We could all witness, almost in real time, how this act was the 
catalyst for Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution and the following wider Arab Spring. In the end, 
rulers were ousted in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen and civil uprisings and protests 
occurred throughout the whole Arab world.  
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Another remarkable case is given by Mikhail Gorbachev in a 2006 Op-ed piece for Project 
Syndicate [15]. According to the 1990 Nobel Peace Prize winner and last head of state of the 
Soviet Union, the nuclear meltdown at Chernobyl, even more than the launch of perestroika, 
was the real cause of the collapse of the Soviet Union five years later. He calls the event a 
Turning Point, mentioning that there was the era before the disaster, and there is the very 
different era that has followed. 
 
During the decades before the accident, the Soviet system had slowly drifted towards 
criticality, with the loss of trust functioning in a similar way as the micro-fractures in a material 
subject to creep. In the presence of facilitating factors, such as a weakening leadership and 
the accumulation of managerial mistakes, growing nationalism and exploitation by the 
political elites to obtain power by independence from the USSR, the weakening of the 
communism ideology, Glasnost’s policy and economic problems, the nuclear accident 
contributed to tip the system over the critical threshold. The nuclear chain reaction triggered 
a social and political chain reaction. The catastrophe was the direct consequence of a mal-
functioning organization with a flawed safety culture, poor communication and a lack of trust 
in its employees and it led to a general disappointment in the competence of the communist 
leaders, a total failure of trust in the system and contributed to the final collapse of the Soviet 
Union. 
 
The first question that comes to mind when studying historical events as well as physical 
processes is which control parameters apply.  What factors have a similar effect on social 
systems that temperature, pressure, or stress have on a physical system? With our 
explanation of the collapse of the Soviet Union, we imply that the level of trust or more 
generally the social capital in a society may function in that way. Support for this assumption 
is documented in detail by Francis Fukuyama, who described in his book Trust [16], the 
impact that the complicated and mysterious cultural process of social capital accumulation 
has on different economic systems. 
 
A more concrete and directly measurable example, though, is given in a 2011 paper by 
Marco Lagi and his colleagues at the New England Complex Systems Institute (NECSI) [17]. 
Their study shows that the timing of outbreaks of violent protests in North Africa and the 
Middle East coincided with large peaks in food prices. This is clearly demonstrated in Figure 
1, which is taken from their paper. It shows the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
Food Price Index and the timing of reported food riots in recent years. Their observations 
suggest that high global food prices are a precipitating condition of social unrest in the World. 
Based on statistical analysis, they make the even stronger claim that food riots occur above 
a certain threshold of the index. 
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Figure 1: The FAO Food Price Index from January 2004 to May 2011. Red dashed vertical lines correspond to 
beginning dates of food riots and protests associated with the major recent unrest in North Africa and the Middle 
East. The overall death toll is given in parentheses. The inset shows the same price index from 1990 to 2011.The 
blue line corresponds to the date on which the authors of the report submitted their findings to the U.S. 
government [10]. 
 
The impact of food, in the form of scarcity due to drought and bad crops over several years, 
had a similar effect in France at the end of the 18th century. Adding to the mismanagement 
by the king and the nobility, the massive debt and sky-rocketing tax rates, it led to the French 
revolution in 1789, with sweeping consequences for Europe and beyond. 
 
 
5- A creepy economy 
Before the credit crisis of 2007-2008 pushed our economy into the great recession, 
economists, policy makers and central bankers, believed that we had transformed into a new 
world of continuous growth and prosperity. This was called the great moderation. It was a 
period of about two decades, characterized by robust and steady GDP growth, low and 
controlled inflation and unemployment and minimal financial volatility. Figure 2 gives some 
historical perspective. Economists were congratulating themselves, believing that those 
successes were the result of an improved economic policy making that was based on the 
scientific progress that their profession had made. It led Robert Lucas, a Nobel Prize winner 
of the University of Chicago, to declare in his 2003 presidential address to the American 
Economic Association that the central problem of depression-prevention has been solved. 
The great crash that followed shattered those dreams when a few hundred billion USD of 
losses in the financial sector cascaded into 5 trillion USD of losses in world GDP and almost 
30 trillion USD of losses in global stock markets [18].  
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Figure 2: The two decades of the great moderation, before the financial crisis in 2007-2008, led to the misguided 
belief of financial specialists that we had transformed into a new world of continuous growth and prosperity (taken 
from a talk on “How we can predict the next financial crisis”, by Didier Sornette at TEDGlobal in 2013) [18]. 
 
This rhetoric during the great moderation is a textbook example of what Reinhart and Rogoff 
call the perception that this time is different [19]. Financial professionals have a short 
memory and extreme events are quickly forgotten, even though they occur far more common 
than people seem to think. Moreover, as human beings, we tend to be driven by the hope or 
belief that the next innovation is always the one that really counts and will change the 
playground irreversibly, as none in the past has done before, hence the “new economy” 
mantra: 
Each time, society convinces itself that the current boom, unlike the many booms that 
preceded catastrophic collapses in the past, is built on sound fundamentals, structural 
reforms, technological innovation, and good policy [19]. 
After studying eight centuries of data, Reinhart and Rogoff come to the conclusion that large-
scale debt build-ups by governments, banks, corporations and consumers are the common 
theme to crises. Using our natural science lingo, we can say that their findings reveal that 
debt is an important control parameter of the economic and financial system. It drives the 
business cycle in a highly non-linear way with long periods of supposed stability punctuated 
with shocks and extreme events, basically flickering between the second and the third 
regime of the creep process, as we have described above. 
 
In our previous piece for the Notenstein Academy, called The Illusion of the Perpetual Money 
Machine [20], we give a similar account of how, since the 1980s, our economy has seen a 
succession of bubbles and crashes. We paint a picture of a highly non-linear system with 
bursts of booms and busts driven by an extraordinary expansion of the financial sphere.  
 
But, what drives this financial sphere? Using 150 years of data, Thomas Philippon of NYU 
Stern School of Business, uncovers the secrets behind the evolution of the U.S. Financial 
Industry. He comes to the conclusion that the share of finance in GDP increases when there 
is a need for intermediation from cash generating companies to cash absorbing companies. 
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In an illuminating paper [21], he explains how the growth of the U.S. Financial sector came in 
three waves followed by three crashes: 
The first large increase between 1880 and 1900 corresponds to the financing of railroads and 
early heavy industries… The second big increase between 1918 and 1933 corresponds to 
the financing of the Electricity revolution, as well as automobile and pharmaceutical 
companies …The third large increase, from 1980 to 2001, corresponds to the financing of the 
IT revolution. [21] 
The full historical picture can be found in Figure 3, which is taken directly from the paper.  
 
We only need to put all the pieces of the puzzle together to come to a coherent view of the 
processes that actually drive our economy. Companies that want to commercialize or 
produce new technological products are generally new, cash poor, growth firms. So, in the 
process of innovation, financial intermediation is needed between old cash generating and 
new, innovative cash absorbing businesses. Consequently, the growth of the financial 
industry is deeply linked to the process of industrial innovation. As Bill Janeway explains in 
his book, Doing Capitalism in the Innovation Economy [22], both speculation and innovation 
are two sides of the same coin, they mutually catalyze each other for growth and wealth 
creation. In other words, innovation in the “real” economy is catalyzed by innovation in the 
financial sphere. 
 
Now, we can construct a universal scenario for a generic boom bust cycle. In a period of new 
innovations, like an industrial revolution, a boom sets in. But, industrial innovation needs 
financial innovation. Consequently, the size of the financial industry increases. This 
overshoots, however, and a disproportional growth of the banking industry finally causes a 
bust and puts an end to the cycle. This process can start again with a new wave of 
innovations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The share of the U.S. Financial Industry in the GDP. There are three large increases: 1880-1900, 1918-
1933 and 1980-2001. Each of these is a period of great innovations where an intermediation from cash rich to 
cash poor companies was needed [21]. 
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This is not just another description of the business cycle. We want to stress that the 
dynamics described here are highly non-linear and extremely asymmetric. Like in the 
mechanical process of creep, long periods of stability and pleasant growth are punctuated 
with extreme events, sudden shocks that reset the system. Because we are hard-wired to 
recognize simple patterns, we quickly forget the shocks and only see and extrapolate the 
local linear behavior of the system, forgetting that our economy is actually creepy.  
 
 
6- Predicting the present 
We have explained that history, in general, and economic systems specifically, behave in 
bursts, similar to the way creep precedes and foretells failures in material sciences. We 
argued that those bursts are not the result of some externality but that they are deeply rooted 
in the fundamental properties and resulting self-organization of the system itself. As there are 
no gods to blame, this puts the responsibility on us. This begs the need to understand our 
social systems better.  
 
Before having the ambition to construct future scenarios, though, the first requisite is to have 
a better understanding of the present. This may seem a trivial thing to do. But, think about it: 
generally, we have no clue about the present instantaneous state of a social system such as 
an economy. We are using data that we get only monthly or quarterly and that comes with a 
lag, like unemployment or GDP, with a lot of incompleteness and imperfection. The metrics 
are outdated, static and do not fully reflect the true dynamical properties of the system, like 
correlation or volatility, and, the supposed underlying processes are no more than a 
theoretical abstraction, like the concept of equilibrium or the hypothesis of an efficient 
market. Let us now give examples of how new data, innovative metrics and dynamical 
models can be used to improve our understanding. 
 
The act of feeling the pulse of our society was coined predicting the present, by Google 
researchers [23], who suggested that the use of Google Trends might give us a better 
understanding of the present. A nice practical example of this is the Google Flu Trends 
monitor. There is a close relationship between how many people search for flu-related topics 
and how many people actually have the flu [24]. As a consequence, by looking at the number 
of Google search queries, the present flu dynamics can be characterize much better than 
any other official record, beating standard approaches which usually lag by weeks. This can 
empower decision makers to react much more efficiently and adapt their policies in real time. 
 
We decided to follow a similar approach to better understand how the world economic 
development and globalization unravels by asking what novel metrics would diagnose the 
rise of the East and the often-discussed decline of the West as well as quantify the pace of 
this transition. We imagined using an open source data set of nighttime light from the 
Defense Meteorological Satellite Program [25], with the nighttime lights on Earth taken as a 
proxy for economic development and energy consumption. Our study showed that, over the 
past two decades, the center of light of our planet recorded by different satellites operating 
between 1992 and 2009 shifted eastwards over a distance of roughly 1000 km, as illustrated 
in Figure 4. Moreover, the World center of light has moved in an accelerated fashion, 
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echoing the economic boom of Asia. This figure, much more material and deeper analyses, 
can be found at the World at Night [26] webpage, which was developed for a master thesis 
project in our research group at ETH Zurich.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: The movement of the planetary center of light as recorded by 5 different satellites that operated 
between 1992 and 2009. Following a global economic regime shift, it can be seen moving eastwards over a 
distance of roughly 1000 km in that period of 17 years. 
 
Clearly, the availability of new data sources can improve our knowledge of the present. This 
is often called the Big Data revolution. There is a lot of new data out there, for example, in 
the form of Tweets or Google search queries, being analyzed by armies of researchers to 
enrich the current knowledge of our social systems. In financial markets, however, massive 
data flows have been available for quite some time. In fact, there is not so much need for 
more data but rather for adequate tools to mine it. The data is there, but we need to know 
where to look and how to interpret it. An example is the new reflexivity index that was 
developed by our research group at ETH Zurich [27,28]. This tool quantifies the level of 
endogeneity in financial markets, defined as the fraction of price-changes that are self-
generated, like aftershocks from an earthquake, rather than the result of new, external or 
exogenous information or driving force. Our analyses show that the level of endogeneity in 
the S&P 500 index of U.S. equities has increased from 30% to approximately 75% in the last 
decade [27]; similar trends are observed in energy and commodities markets over that same 
period [28]. This means that markets are increasingly leading a life on their own, only 
partially driven by external news and are becoming more disconnected from the physical 
reality. One main reason is likely the rise of algorithmic trading and more specifically of High 
Frequency Trading (HFT). 
 
Besides, there is increasing evidence of “glitches” in the system like the flash crash of 6 May 
2010, the hash crash in 23 April 2013, and the recent three-hour halt on the Nasdaq Stock 
Market on 22 August 2013. Preliminary analyses suggest that these could be the outcomes 
of a system approaching criticality [27,28]. Clearly, financial markets have a very important 
function in our society, that of pricing, of providing efficient allocation of capital and of 
allowing risk diversification. But also here, the law of diminishing returns rules and, at a 
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certain point, more does not necessarily mean better: more markets may push the system 
over into criticality. 
 
Besides using good data and the right metrics, we also need to apply dynamical models that 
take into account non-linear behavior and the resulting non-stationarity of financial systems, 
in order to be able to calculate the risk of a critical transition. An example of such an analysis 
is given in Figure 5. We analyzed 60 years of quarterly data of Nominal GDP divided by the 
Total Liabilities of the Non Financial Sector in the U.S. This measure gives the efficiency of 
debt. It tells you how many USD of GDP are generated for each USD of debt in the Non 
Financial sector. It can be seen that, also here, the law of diminishing returns is at work; a 
0.7 USD return on debt in 1953 dropped to 0.3 USD in 2013.  
 
The question is whether this drop is sustainable. This can only be answered by using non-
linear dynamical models. We analyzed the dataset using a proprietary model called DS LPPL 
TrustTM that was developed by our research team at ETH Zurich. The model, whose engine 
is described for instance in [29,30], quantifies the criticality of the system; the risk for a 
change-in-regime. In Figure 5, the result of this analysis is given as a solid grey line. The 
results are alarming and point to a real risk for a critical transition. We explained that there is 
clear evidence that debt is a strong driver of our economic system. Our research shows that 
the effectiveness or usefulness of this debt is collapsing at an unsustainable rate. Moreover, 
it indicates that the point of a critical transition is nearby. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: The efficiency of U.S. Non Financial debt. The dots tell you how many USD of GDP are generated for 
each USD of U.S. Non Financial debt. The black double line gives an LPPL model fit and the grey line gives the 
DS LPPL Trust index. When this index exceeds the 5% level, the process is not sustainable and there is a 
substantial risk for a critical transition of the system. 
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7- Scenarios for the future 
Until now, we have argued that financial markets, economies and societies are controlled by 
slow and barely noticeable creep processes that often mature into abrupt nonlinear 
instabilities and changes of regime. This insight permits a natural classification of possible 
future scenarios making a distinction between those that are mainly endogenous and those 
that depend more on exogenous developments. We use the colorful terminology introduced 
by the executive board of Notenstein, as it matches well the classification that results from 
the creep-bifurcation theory.  
 
Endogenous scenarios: 
 
“Muddling along” is the scenario in which the system creeps under an existing set of 
stresses and constraints, where central banks and policy makers try to maintain a semblance 
of status quo, when pain slowly builds up with a general impoverishment of 99% of the 
population as a result of disguised inflation, confiscatory taxations and progressive dilution of 
social and retirement benefits. The science of creep and the mathematics of bifurcation both 
suggest however that, while “muddling along” can persist longer than often expected, it 
cannot be perennial and either evolves into a more stable regime (“managing through”) or 
abruptly collapses into a system failure (“blood red abyss”). 
 
“Managing through” occurs when creep is counterbalanced by healing. While the forces of 
degradation are still present, restructuration and transformation can lead to adaptation and a 
kind of rebirth. This is exemplified by Canada, which extricated itself from a dire situation and 
exhibited a strong recovery in the 1990s, following courageous fiscal restructuration, deficit 
reductions, stringent inflation reduction and a reorientation of industrial activities to the novel 
economic realities. It should be noted however that Canada is a relatively small economy 
that benefitted from the strong growth of its giant southern neighbor and of a large part of the 
rest of the World, and thus could build a strong exportation base. In contrast, the task for 
Europe, as well as the U.S. and Japan, seems herculean due to their size and impact, as the 
economic growth in the world and in particular in Asia is expected to considerably slow down 
and a currency war-of-sort is unfolding in beggar-thy-neighbor attempts. 
 
“Blood red abyss” is the straightforward, likely and very painful final stage of creep, the 
tertiary regime of sudden accelerated damage, ending in the failure of existing institutions. 
There are several pathways to the “blood red abyss’’. We can imagine a complete finance 
freeze, in which, one day, market participants refuse to continue to play along with central 
banks and, through contagion, their trust in sovereign debts evaporates abruptly in a massive 
and generalized effective bank run. Or, the policy makers who implement their “muddling 
along” tactics engineer unwillingly waves of social upheaval powered by the disenchanted 
and frustrated unemployed youths, which spiral into constitutional crises, perhaps even 
revolutions and wars. 
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 Exogenous scenarios: 
 
“Painful adjustment” occurs under the influence of external factors and forces. In the 
material science analogy, it can take the form of a repair provided by an externally applied 
plaster or glue. It is the response to exogenous conditions and influences that constrains the 
economy to change its trajectory, to adapt its internal organization, most likely unwillingly and 
with resistance and hesitations. In all likelihood, it is not more stable than “muddling along” 
but buys time and, to those unaware of the present piece, gives the illusion of a long-term 
solution. In our previous analysis [13], we diagnosed without ambiguity that much of the 
developed world has inherited a state resulting from three decades of unfunded consumption 
and of living beyond one’s mean, which we called  “the Illusion of the Perpetual Money 
Machine’’. The needed readjustments are obviously severe and of large impact, from deep 
fiscal reforms, the reorganization of a sustainable social security, more thinking about how to 
ensure stronger social capital and better distribution of wealth, which is the glue between 
people at the origin of the health of nations, redesigning incentives at all levels of society and 
fighting inequity not with easy access to credit to increase consumption but with improved 
participation, e.g. by emphasizing excellent targeted education and continuous education 
(without e.g. the massive student loans debt). 
 
Before innovation and growth take again control towards a better health of the economy, the 
readjustment will necessarily lead to painful destruction of buying power and entitlements. 
Readjustments may be triggered or further necessitated by other exogenous conditions, such 
as more severe adverse impacts from global climate change, large-scale environmental 
degradations, 1918-like flu pandemics and others. While we, humans, are obsessed with our 
human-made problems and calamities, we tend to forget that we live in and from a “small 
planet”, our still unique spacecraft for survival in the immensity of a very inhospitable and 
immense space. 
 
 “Golden East” is the exogenous scenario where the solution to worsening economic 
conditions in the West could come at least in part from Chinese and Eurasian saviors. 
Without endogenous healing, the structure continues to hold because external support is 
added and the applied stress changes in nature. With the emergence of a large middle class 
in China, India and Indonesia, the growth of demand in eastern markets could foster exports 
of developed economies to their new customers in need of high-tech and high fashion 
products. Moreover, Europe could become even more the touristic attraction of the world of 
wealthy Americans, Asians and Africans (with the risk of having tourism as a “resource 
curse”), offering its historical cities, deep-rooted cultures, arts and savoir-vivre. Without 
doubt, this would also require a significant reorganization. However, given the exogenous 
dependence on the East, this scenario does not appear stable either and would likely unfold 
sooner or later in one of the four previous ones, if only because the impact would also likely 
unfold on the global ecological footprint as suggested by the dismal state of the environment 
in growth-hungry China. 
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